I teach my students that foreign policy is persuading other
countries to do what you want. The tools available to accomplish this include
everything from kind words to cruise missiles. Mixing them properly and with
sufficient patience is the art of diplomacy, a task that for the United States
has proved challenging even with our closest allies, and altogether necessary
with the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The United
States and Iran have been locked in an adversarial relationship since the 1979
hostage crisis. Having worked for President Jimmy Carter, I viewed the country
through the prism of that experience when I served in the Clinton
administration. Nevertheless, as secretary of state I felt it important to
explore the possibility of developing a less chilly relationship with Iran.
During my time in office, we offered to engage in dialogue, but
the Iranians were not ready. In the end, although we improved the relationship
on the margins, we failed to make much of a dent in the thick wall of mistrust
separating our two countries.
These
experiences lead me to be wary of the Iranian regime and realistic about the
prospects for an overnight change in U.S.-Iranian relations. But it is
dangerous not to pursue dialogue, and experience convinces me that the nuclear
agreement between world powers and Iran is a wise diplomatic initiative.
After careful
review of its provisions, I have given the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
my strong endorsement.
The prospect of
a nuclear-armed Iran has rightfully earned a place at the top of the long list
of threats to global stability. No diplomatic agreement or military action
could guarantee that Iran will never obtain a nuclear weapon, but even most
opponents agree this accord puts that goal firmly out of Iran's reach for a
decade or more. From any vantage point, that is a positive development, but at
a time of great turmoil in the Middle East it is especially welcome.
One of the main
criticisms that has been leveled against the JCPOA is that it does not address
other abhorrent aspects of Iran's behavior -- its support of terrorism, its
jailing of several Iranian-Americans, its rhetoric against the United States
and Israel or its other destabilizing activities in the broader Middle East. In
theory, the United States could have pursued a comprehensive agreement with
Iran covering issues beyond the nuclear file, but experience suggests that such
an approach would not have yielded results.
By zeroing in on the nuclear issue, the Obama administration
took on the most dangerous threat posed by the Iranian regime and brought
together the international community around the issue that most united it in
opposition to Tehran.
The completion
of the nuclear accord does not preclude progress on these other issues. In
fact, it gives the United States new tools to shape Iranian behavior. Going
forward, the United States should do so by focusing on three key areas:
First, we must subject the
implementation of the JCPOA to the strongest oversight possible. Iran has agreed to intrusive, 24/7
measures to monitor and verify its compliance. We should press relentlessly to
ensure every one of them is enforced, make clear that we will be closely
scrutinizing Iran's actions and signal our commitment to following through on
implementation. For that reason, I welcome reports that
the Obama administration will name a respected senior diplomat to coordinate
implementation of the agreement. Congress can also play a positive role and
needs to be a partner in monitoring the agreement.
Second, we must maintain a robust
deterrent in the region, increase our efforts to counter Iranian proxies and further
enhance the conventional military capabilities of our allies and partners
relative to Iran.
Before the
agreement was finalized, the President jump-started this process by convening
an historic meeting with Arab leaders at Camp David and since then dispatched
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter to Israel and Saudi Arabia to follow up.
Next month, King
Salman of Saudi Arabia will come to Washington to continue these discussions.
With both Israel and our Gulf partners, we should establish a revamped regional
system of security backed by an enduring commitment to their capabilities and
strong U.S. guarantees.
Despite Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's public opposition to the agreement, it is
all but certain that Israel and the United States will move toward completing a
new long-term security assistance agreement that will further enhance Israel's
already substantial qualitative military edge. And next year, the United States
will significantly augment Israel's capabilities by delivering to it the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter, making it the only military in the region to possess this
advanced stealth fighter aircraft.
These steps will
increase pressure on Iran and can outweigh any gains its military and
intelligence institutions receive as a result of the easing of some
international sanctions. But our policy must go beyond isolation and
containment. We must use all the foreign policy tools at our disposal.
To that end, the third leg of our
approach should involve carefully calibrated engagement with Iran.
It is not
insignificant that senior American and Iranian officials have now had regular
opportunities to interact and establish relationships. We should build on that,
because Iran is not monolithic. It is a country where theocrats and reformers
are present at the same time, where there are ideologues exporting hate and a
sizable commercial class that wants to engage productively with the world.
It is in
America's interest to cultivate good will with those Iranians who are
dissatisfied with the international isolation Iran's external policies and
unelected leaders have brought it. By showing Iran that international
cooperation can bring tangible benefits, the agreement provides them with
reason to push for further change.
Many people I
respect have voiced concerns about this agreement, but I believe the
administration has provided solid answers to their questions. It troubles me
that many opponents came out against the JCPOA before even reading the text.
The advocates
for a vote of disapproval in Congress have also not put forward a viable
alternative or any plan to deal with the consequences of rejection. And make no
mistake, those consequences would be grave.
Rejection of this accord would leave the United States isolated
and Iranian hardliners empowered. It would be practically impossible to
reassemble the coalition that united against Iran's nuclear activities and
imposed the robust sanctions regime that brought Iran to the table. Many of our
tools of influence in the region would be rendered useless, and it would hurt
our ability to lead on a range of pressing global issues.
Rejection of
this agreement would be a strategic setback for the United States, one that our
rivals and adversaries would not ignore.
In a turbulent
Middle East, there is no way to predict what the next decade will bring. But
the United States will be in a far better position to shape events in the
region with this nuclear agreement in place than without it. This accord is a
bold stroke of diplomacy, and an opportunity we must not waste.
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